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I'm Sarah Wilrich, intern at Lawfare with an episode from the Lawfare Archive for July 18th, 2026. On July 13th, Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced a new campaign to, quote, dismantle the threat posed by the International Criminal Court to U.S. sovereignty, unquote. Rubio's proposed actions include urging other countries to withdraw from the ICC, sanctions against the ICC, and visa revocations for ICC personnel. For today's archive, I chose an episode from February 3, 2025, in which Tyler McBrien spoke with Nima Milininia, a former prosecutor at the International Criminal Court, an international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, about the Trump administration's...

efforts to sanction the ICC. They discussed the many criticisms of the court, what effects sanctions would have on the court's ability to function, and more.

It's the Lawfare Podcast. I'm Tyler McBrien, Managing Editor of Lawfare, with Nima Milaninia, a former prosecutor at the International Criminal Court and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, as well as a current partner at the law firm King & Spaulding.

We typically reserve sanctions for criminal institutions, and we don't and should not target human rights bodies, especially those which have been given a mandate to investigate and prosecute the worst crimes that mankind experiences.

Today, we're talking about recent efforts by the Trump administration and the U.S. Congress to sanction the ICC. So, Nima, I want to start with the U.S. Congress and the status of the bill that is intending to sanction the ICC, though I proceed with some caution because we are recording on January 29th and it's a bit of a fast-moving story. So could you just catch us up to speed as of right now of the status of this legislation and what's in the bill?

Thanks, Tyler. And thanks again for having me here. And I think this is obviously not just an important topic, but as you mentioned, a timely one. And before I begin, let me just caveat everything and note that obviously my remarks here reflect my personal thoughts and are not intended to be attributed to any organization that I am or have been a part of. But Tyler, to answer your question, I think it's important to understand that there's been two parallel tracks for sanctions, and both are at different phases and have different histories. The first is there is a current track that's already concretized concerning sanctions imposed by executive order. As some of your listeners may recall, during the first Trump administration, the president issued sanctions by executive order on June 11, 2020, in response to the progression on the Afghanistan situation, which at that point encompassed potentially allegations against U.S. personnel, both defense personnel, but also personnel in the intelligence branch in relation to crimes alleged with regards to rendition, but also the detention sites that U.S. personnel worked on in Afghanistan. Those sanctions were rescinded by President Biden shortly after he took office. However, those have then now been reinstated as part of President Trump's second term first day executive order. So we currently actually have a state already whereby the sanctions that the president had imposed during his first term have been restored. And what we're waiting upon, arguably, is designations as to who those would target, since the persons that were targeted during the president's first term are no longer in office. And those individuals were the former prosecutor, Fatou Ben-Nasuda, and her cooperation advisor. Now there's a second track, obviously, which is legislative sanctions. And there were no congressional sanctions that were imposed during President Trump's first term. The first that these sanctions were advanced was actually under the last year of President Biden's term following arrest warrant applications issued by Prosecutor Khan in his investigation against both Israeli officials and Hamas officials after he announced that he had filed for applications against Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel, and then Defense Minister Gallant. At that point, a House bill was passed with support from A quite significant number of Democratic members of the House as well, about 40. However, obviously, as a new Congress took hold, and given the fact that the Senate at that point had not moved a sanctions bill, they had to start anew, which is what we see currently.

So the House again has passed the same version of a sanctions legislation that they had advanced last year, passing it this time with 45 members of the Democratic caucus and the same number of Republican members. And that's again before the Senate. And as of yesterday, in fact, and I know we're recording this on on the 29th, the Senate has tried to move it and they weren't able to get it passed by a cloture. All members of the Democratic Caucus, with the exception of Senator Fetterman, voted against moving it past an open debate and not therefore getting to 60 votes. And it is to be seen whether or not further efforts will be made to try to.

push this and get some form of consensus across the two parties for a Senate version of this

legislation. Thanks for that. That's a really helpful starting point. But to back up even one step, why pursue two tracks of sanctions? In other words, what would this bill do that the Trump administration can't do with executive action? There's two elements of this,

which are motivating legislative action. There's obviously the political element of this, which is to demonstrate, not just from an executive standpoint, but also from a legislative standpoint, our alliance in support of Israel, but also obviously our support of U.S. personnel. And that's certainly been amongst the talking points that have been advanced by individuals, including Senator Fetterman, as of yesterday, for why they support a sanctions legislation at the legislative level, even though executive action has already been taken. The second, and this has also been remarked upon by especially the Republican members of both the House and the Senate, is a desire to prevent a circumstance that had already occurred, whereby a subsequent president, especially from the Democratic Party, can overturn sanctions against the ICC, and therefore to not permit what President Biden did in his first few months, which is rescind by executive order sanctions that were imposed by the administration. Those are the two main motivating causes here for why the legislation continues to push forward a sanctions bill.

Out of curiosity, did the Senate blocking the bill yesterday surprise you?

Yes and no. The Senate Dems have always balked against sanctions legislation as, in particular, going too far, given the fact that sanctions by their very nature are tools that we tend to use as blunt instruments to try to combat terrorist organizations and obviously armed groups like cartels. They're not tools that are typically known for being discreet or tailored or can be tailored in a way to target very specific interests or aims. And many members of the Senate Dems have remarked on this and were the reason why a sanctions legislation didn't advance during the time in which they were part of the majority. So it's not too surprising to see them also oppose the sanctions legislation this time around. In particular, given the fact that even though such legislation is really intended to target efforts to aid and assist an ICC investigation or prosecution concerning U.S. personnel and personnel or nationals of our allies, because they're blunt instruments, by definition, they'll have implications for other investigations that we do support support, like the ICC's investigation on Ukraine, where they've already issued arrest warrants against Vladimir Putin, but other senior members of the Russian military and political establishment. But also in Darfur, where we see an ongoing violence and where the secretary has supported a genocide determination. And Libya, another circumstance where the United States supported a Security Council referral to the ICC, but also the institution writ large, because sanctions do have the impact of not just targeting, obviously, individuals, but also the institution and organizations, especially U.S. companies, which provide necessary resources to the institution. And many members of the Senate Democratic Caucus have opined on this exact fact. And in fact, what we've seen over the course of the past 48 hours is a lot of big tech companies that are incorporated here in the U.S. express these similar concerns to both the Senate Dems and

instead of Republicans. Yeah, it's really interesting. It seems as if you're saying in some cases, Republicans and Democrats are much closer in that the difference isn't so much ideological as it is tactical. And I wonder if we could break that down a bit. I was hoping you could sort of sketch out the different camps or the different schools of thinking on the ICC within Congress or within the U.S. government broadly. To set that up, I wanted to just read quickly something that Tom Cotton posted on X shortly after the Senate blocked the bill. He wrote, this was on January 28th, the ICC is a corrupt international organization that targets Americans and our allies. Instead of standing up for our sovereignty and national security, Senate Democrats just voted to allow the ICC to continue to target U.S. troops. So I want to break that down a bit. I wonder if you can sort of sketch out what you see as the major criticisms among both Democrats and Republicans about the ICC.

Sure. I think we can take one step back and I'll just break down where I think we have a general bipartisan consensus and where I think things then fall apart in terms of where there's deep political divisions. And the first begins, I think, more in relation to the rule of law ecosystem more generally at the international level, where I genuinely, truly believe there is bipartisan, not consensus, but a general understanding that we need a system of rule of law at the international level as an element of exerting our core national security interests. We need an international framework of rule of law for purposes of international trade, which I know is something obviously of deep significance and importance for this administration. We need it for purposes of deep national security interests as relates to our conflict with China and securing and supporting our allies there, such as South Korea and their interests over the South China Sea. And we obviously need it for other issues that are currently percolating, for which we're engaged in negotiations and disputes, such as access and rights over the Panama Canal, and obviously access to mineral deposits in Greenland, but also elsewhere, as we're seeing those conversations happening. So there is a deep understanding, irrespective of the rhetoric that we hear oftentimes by both sides of the House, but also obviously in the executive, that we need a system of rule of law at the international level.

Just before we get into the flip side of that, where have you seen recently, especially among Republicans, voicing or at least reflecting this consensus or these shared values? I'm thinking maybe as an example, some of Secretary Rubio's statements in his confirmation hearing.

That's right. I think that's a good touching point. I mean, Secretary Rubio during his confirmation hearing didn't talk about destroying our system of international laws and agreements. He rather reflected upon why they're so important and why it's important to be careful when we're entering into certain arrangements. And the way he described it, and the way I would argue many administrations think about it, is that whenever we engage at the international level, either by agreement, or in terms of negotiating bilateral or multilateral arrangements, is by definition, we cede an aspect of our sovereignty. Because we're no longer saying that we're going to be bound strictly by domestic laws and processes, but rather we're going to also cede parts of our authority to an international institution or an international arrangement. And that's also in the case of, for instance, trade. That's also in the case of access to resources. But obviously, in this instance, it's also in the case of whether we bind ourselves or not to international institutions such as the ICC or other international courts and tribunals. So Senator Rubio's remarks are telling not from the standpoint just of the fact that he supports in general the notion of international arrangements, but rather that we need to take them and we should be taking them

very seriously. I unfortunately interrupted you a bit ago when you were on a bit of a roll. I believe you were about to break down some of where this consensus diverges. So that is to say, where are the points of departure on the ICC, especially among Republicans and Democrats on the pro-sanctions camp, anti-sanctions camp? If we take it one level below what I was

describing in terms of the rule of law ecosystem is the space where the ICC occupies, which is the space of accountability in international crimes. Again, I start from the general proposition that even there, with again, outliers on both sides of the hill, general consensus that there needs to be some form of accountability for there to be deterrence for international crimes, and that that form of accountability should happen by international institutions where domestic institutions don't have the ability or incapacitated to ensure liability or responsibility for individuals involved in the commission of those crimes, be it war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. And on that level, we even saw efforts during the last Congress to expand authorities, not only that we have in the U.S. to prosecute for those crimes, but also to support accountability for those offenses at the international level, including by the ICC. In fact, it was Senator Graham who led the charge to expand our authorities to be able to cooperate with the ICC to ensure that we could support the institution in its investigation concerning Ukraine. Russia in its crime of aggression against Ukraine is also one of the most effective ways by which we can deter similar types of offenses from being committed by other countries, including Russia again. Now, where that consensus, however, breaks down is where there's efforts by the court and those institutions to investigate instances that concern our allies, but I would argue to investigate instances where there is a deeper conflict with our foreign policy objectives writ large, such that when the court does go after Israel or decides to investigate us, but I would argue also where we'd investigate other nationals of countries that we have close ties to, that we believe they go too far. And there is a breakdown in consensus with regards to what the appropriate response should be in those circumstances. There is consensus, I would argue, that the court goes too far when it takes on those cases, including the cases that I mentioned, because oftentimes there's no consent to the court's jurisdiction by those states as in the case with Israel, but also as in the case with us. But where it breaks down is as to what the appropriate response should be in such circumstances. And just staying with the

critiques, one more beat. What do you make of the claim I just mentioned made by Tom Cotton that participation in the ICC is not only bad because of a certain amount of ceding sovereignty, but in fact, he goes further in accusing the court of targeting Americans specifically. Do you see any evidence for that claim? There's no evidence that the court is

targeting Americans specifically. And in fact, if anything, recent developments suggest that any investigation that could have included US personnel have been removed and are off the table. Prosecutor Khan, when he first took office, made it a point to announce, and he announced it publicly, which he does not usually do in relation to other investigations, that his investigation in the situation concerning Afghanistan was going to deprioritize other elements of that investigation that did not concern the offenses that occurred after the Taliban took over Kabul and the rest of Afghanistan, which by definition meant that he was not going to prioritize or advance an investigation against U.S. personnel or other non-Afghan international officials. Coupled with the fact that just in the past two weeks, he announced arrest warrant applications for the first time in that situation against two senior Taliban leaders. And in announcing those applications, reiterated the fact that his investigation, though not complete, was going to continue against members of the Taliban, but also members of Ayas Khurasan, explicitly omitting, therefore, any aspect of his investigation concerning U.S. personnel or, again, other international figures. And that I don't think was done by omission or neglect, but that sent a clear, explicit message that his investigation against the U.S. and any investigation against U.S. personnel is likely concluded and no longer going to continue or

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I think there are two overriding critiques that members of Congress are concerned about that both relate to the prosecutor specifically, but also the institution more generally. And at the end of the day is what's fueling a lot of the reactions that we're currently seeing. The first is one of the prosecutor acting more politically than he is acting independently and by application of the rule of law. And in particular, there is a deep sense, and I would argue not a fully erroneous one, that as it relates to Israel, in particular, that the prosecutor acted unfairly and was motivated in part by some level of politics. And I say that by virtue of the following. There is a sense, and it is clear, that the manner in which the prosecutor approached the government of Israel is different than the manner in which he has approached other governments in other investigations. So for instance, he has made efforts since he's taken office to meet with the heads of states of Venezuela when he had gone to Venezuela and in fact took a photo op with Maduro. He has met with General Heftar in Libya and when offered the opportunity to meet with senior Israeli officials in Israel, turned that trip down at the very last minute and announced the arrest warrant applications against, as I mentioned, Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Golan. The second aspect of this, of that fairness critique, is the way in which the prosecutor himself has also applied rules, seems to be different vis-a-vis Israel versus other states. So there is currently pending litigation before the court by Israel about the fact that the Israeli government had asked for a deferral of the investigation, a right which is permitted under the Rome statute, which the prosecutor decided to unilaterally reject and fail to notify the pretrial chamber about, and obviously did not suspend his investigation after receiving the deferral request. In contrast, in relation to the investigations pertaining to Venezuela and the Philippines, when in receipt of a similar deferral request, the prosecutor did not unilaterally adjudicate the terms of those requests, but rather suspended his investigation, notified the relevant pretrial chambers, and then when he had sought to resume the investigation, requested leave from the court. And I would argue that that's actually the procedure that's outlined specifically in the Rome statute. And it's that difference in both

the application of the rules, but also in the treatment of Israel that has raised fairness concerns, not just by those who are advancing support for sanctions, obviously, but also on the Dem side by those who are deeply concerned with regards to how the prosecutor is conducting himself. And I would note that that's also the concern that was explicitly noted by both President Biden and Secretary Blinken at the time in which the arrest warrant applications were issued. The second element of this, which is more institutional, which is there's concern with regards to both the court's extension of jurisdiction beyond the states that have consented to the Rome Statute, as well as the deference that it gives to states that have fully functioning and independent judiciaries and the application of the principle of complementarity, which is a bedrock principle of the court, which notes that the court should only step in whenever the state itself is unwilling or unable to.

to investigate and prosecute. To that, there's a deeper sense that the court is exerting its jurisdiction well beyond the parameters that were identified for it at the timing in which the Rome Statute was negotiated. Because over time, what we've seen is the court using more advanced and involved understandings of jurisdiction to extend its authorities beyond just the states who have ratified the Rome Statute, but to arguably cover jurisdiction or have jurisdiction over any state around the world where there is some nexus between the crime and that state's jurisdiction. So for instance, in the circumstance as it relates to the displacement of the Rohingya population from Burma to Bangladesh, while the government of Burma has not ratified the Rome statute, the court has been able to extend jurisdiction over those crimes by arguing that displacement by its very nature has as a criminal element, a cross-border component to it. And because that cross-border element occurred on the territory of Bangladesh, which is a state party, then the court should have jurisdiction over the matter, even though the acts of coercion and the acts which caused the population to flee occurred on the territory of a non-state party. And when we extrapolate on that, and given the fact that displacement crimes have a tendency of occurring anywhere where we see conflict around the world, it does really broaden the ambit of the course jurisdiction to cover a much wider swath than those territories of states which have become parties to the Rome Statute. So there is a deep underwriting concern here, and I don't think this is just a U.S. concern. I think there's concern more generally around the diplomatic circle, including by our allies. But the court has extended itself well beyond the limits for which it was founded. And going to the sovereignty concerns that I think Senator Rubio articulated during his confirmation hearing has now exceeded its authorities to the territories of states that have purposely decided not to consent to the court's jurisdiction. The second element of this is complementarity. And I can touch upon this just very briefly, but we can obviously elaborate on this more. And this was highlighted in an amicus brief that the German government submitted actually at the pretrial level following the issuance of the arrest warrant applications, which is that the court's test for complementarity, which is itself quite narrow, it requires at the domestic level that the investigation or prosecution concern the same persons and substantially the same conduct, does not account for the fact that there are systems in domestic institutions which may not or choose not to go after those specific individuals, but are inherently independent

and democratic, and that that fact should factor into the calculation as to whether or not we give deference to the domestic institutions. So the German argument was, and I think there is actually some agreement in the diplomatic circle, again, of this concern, that there should be some element of the complementarity test that says, hey, listen, Israel, which has a fully functioned and independent judiciary, a fully functioned and independent attorney general's office, should be given more leeway in terms of whether we defer to it than other states like Russia, where obviously the judicial apparatus and the prosecutorial apparatus is controlled by the state itself. And that if you don't give deference or if you don't weigh that as part of the complementarity analysis, then something is broken in terms of the court's foundational requirement of looking towards domestic institutions before taking on cases as an

institution of last resort. So taking these seemingly very legitimate concerns and shared among diverse parties. Why are sanctions not the correct tool here? And what can the United States do to push for reform in lieu of sanctions? And this is, I think it's a great question. And this

is where we see obviously division that's now playing out before Congress and before the Senate as to what the appropriate response should be. Because all of the issues that I just mentioned, We could debate about them. We could have an argument as to whether or not the prosecutor did act fairly. We can have a debate as to whether or not he has exerted himself politically. We can have a debate about the jurisdiction and complementarity concerns that I mentioned. And there are reasonable arguments, I would argue, on both sides concerning that debate. Where I fundamentally disagree with folks who want to respond to those concerns.

is that sanctions is an appropriate response. And I fundamentally disagree not only from the standpoint that we typically reserve sanctions for criminal institutions, and we don't and should not target human rights bodies, especially those which have been given a mandate to investigate and prosecute the worst crimes that mankind experiences, but also as an appropriate response from protecting U.S. national security concerns. If we look just narrowly at the how do we best protect Israel or how do we best protect U.S. personnel, sanctions were neither, and the threat of sanctions, I should say, were neither effective the first time around in terms of mitigating those concerns and protecting our personnel or protecting Israel, nor are effective in that aim this time around. The ability for us to negotiate and the ability for us to defend Israel is highly dependent upon us having a credible voice, both within the ICC, but obviously with our allies who form part of the Assembly of State Parties, which is the legislative and administrative body of the ICC. And that influence that we have and can carry is diminished the moment we assert threats against the court, because the court, as well as the states who support it, have a tendency of becoming very defensive when faced with existential threats or threats of force against it. So just purely from a how do we best protect our personnel standpoint, how do we best protect Israel standpoint, sanctions are not the most effective tool. Related to that, sanctions also won't do the thing that I would argue many members of Congress want done, which is cause a reversal of the arrest warrants that have already been issued. As we currently, as of today, the government of Israel has already filed an appeal against the arrest warrants, and that appeal is pending before the appeals chamber. There is a good possibility that the appeals chamber decides, for many of the legal reasons that I articulated before, that the prosecutor acted unlawfully by virtue of not deferring his investigation or not applying the principle of complementarity correctly or extending jurisdiction beyond the bounds of what is legally permissible under the Rome statute and chooses to reverse the arrest warrants on those grounds. The ability of the appeals chamber to render a decision that is legally focused and in an independent way is undermined under the threat of sanctions, A, because it may encourage states like Israel who are working with the court in order to get a legal remedy that is in its best interest to stop working with the court. But B, it may put

the judges themselves in this bind where in an effort to not be seen as capitulating to political pressures, they issue or render a decision that goes the direction of supporting the arrest warrants as even though the legal arguments would have, in another circumstance, resonated with their

decision to annul the arrest warrants. So in addition to perhaps forcing the judges and others in the institution to this defensive posture, another way to get at this question is what would and have sanctions materially done to the court, its work, the prosecutors? You've have past experience working in the office of the prosecutor, though not for the current prosecutor, but his predecessor, I believe. And as many listeners will also know, the ICC does not benefit from the protection of a UN Security Council resolution, for example. So what do sanctions materially do to the ICC? How does it affect their work? There's pretty broad effects,

as I mentioned. Sanctions are, by definition, a blunt instrument, and you can imagine they'll have blunt results. But Tyler, before I go there, let me revert back to the previous point I made and just add one issue, which is I mentioned how sanctions weren't and cannot and are not an effective tool for those narrow objectives that certainly members of the Senate, but also the administration want. But I would argue they're ineffective in actually clatterability to get the more structural reforms that we, but also many of our allies in many other states also think need to be undertaken in order to rein the court back with regards to the expansive jurisdictional framework that is constructed, but also that narrow complementarity framework, which everyone has, or many folks in many states have concerns about. Since those discussions happen at the diplomatic level, and by virtue of removing us from the discussions, we have less of an ability to obviously influence those discussions in a manner that might be best for our long-term interests as it relates to the ICC. As it relates to the implications that sanctions could have, there's the immediate implications concerning the individuals who are designated. Their properties are blocked, there's visa restrictions for both themselves, but also their family members, and there's also the possibility of civil and criminal penalties for individuals who provide any form of assistance towards the sanctioned individuals or towards the investigations for which the sanctions are intending to target. Now, while that may seem narrow, it does have broader implications, including for U.S. companies, which is why we've seen them become more and more involved. As a general matter, and this happened during the first time in which President Trump instituted his executive orders for sanctions. It's very difficult to cabin off high-level officials from the day-to-day work of the institution on other things. The prosecutor has purview, obviously, over not just one investigation, but over all investigations. And on top of it, especially if you have judges being sanctioned, there's the implications for the judiciary writ large over all of its matters and not just them specifically. And what we saw in the first instance when sanctions were imposed the first time around is that the court tried to take remedial or mitigating measures such as cabining off the prosecutor from certain investigations or blocking or altering the accounts by which they were getting remuneration or having other individuals in line to do briefings before the United Nations. But those were temporary measures that were being undertaken that in the long term would not have worked. And in many ways,

the institution was saved by the fact that the measures that were in place lasted only for about a year before President Biden revoked them. In this instance, I think what we can see is a variety of different tactics that both the court will take and the international community may take But none of which I would argue will be that effective in the long run. One is, like I mentioned, cabining off the individuals who are working on the files for which Congress is targeting sanctions for. So cabining off the individuals who are working on the Israel investigation and possibly the Afghanistan situation from working on other investigations so that the argument for who is providing material support can be limited to only a few number of individuals. They may also look to import different anti-blocking regimes aimed at encouraging financial institutions and other institutions in the EU to continue operations with the court by providing them a protective apparatus. But those, again, only go a short way. Ultimately, what sanctions have an impact of doing is not just directly impacting those individuals, but causing and creating difficulties and friction within the institution that causes it to slow down its operations writ large or cause private entities which work with the institution and which the institution relies upon to step away entirely. So for instance, Microsoft is one company. Microsoft currently provides the cybersecurity infrastructure for the entire institution. It is the security apparatus for protecting the court against cyber attacks, as we saw two years ago by Russian-affiliated organizations after the arrest warrant against Vladimir Putin was instituted. It is very possible that Microsoft decides no longer to cooperate or provide services to the court in light of sanctions, even if there is a very narrow pathway for it to comply. Similarly, other companies like Meta or Relativity, which provide services or which respond to subpoenas for information, may stop cooperating with the court entirely. And if you think about the knock-on effects as to what they may mean, obviously what that does is not only inhibit the ability of the court to access incredibly important information for evidential purposes, but also arrest opportunities, but also make third parties which cooperate with the court, like witnesses and victims, much more vulnerable to attack by institutions that are hostile to it, like Russia or otherwise.

So are there any other mitigating measures the ICC can take or should be taking to further sanctions-proof its institution? Or are sanctions really something of an existential? threat? Sanctions are an existential threat. The registrar for the court has both publicly but also in private meetings with other state parties. It noted very explicitly that after conducting a review as to how both targeted but also obviously blood-based sanctions could impact the court's operations, that they have determined that it is an existential threat to the court, maybe not so much in the short term per se, especially if sanctions don't target the institution, but certainly in the long term. So there is very little that the court can truly do in order to protect itself from sanctions beyond what I just mentioned, which is capiting off certain individuals who are designated so that they don't, quote unquote, pollute the rest of the institution and also looking for other providers which may not have significant business operations in the U.S. and can therefore survive a circumstance where they would be prohibited from accessing accounts or business opportunities in the United States. So I would argue that in the long run, even if the institution is able to survive sanctions in a year or two in an interim period, that there are broad-based implications that sanctions can have that are existential in nature, even if they themselves are targeted. And that is, by the way, just to go back to the congressional dynamics, The fact that many congressional Dems have been pointing out as to why, even though they may agree with the more general concern that the Republican caucus has concerning the court's overstep, the prosecutor's lack of fair treatment of Israel, and obviously the politics that the prosecutor seems to have been engaging in, that sanctions are not the right appropriate or the appropriate tool for responding to those issues.

So let's say that U.S. government officials unfortunately do not listen to this episode and we are left with a world in which prolonged sanctions render the ICC effectively ineffective or it essentially destroys the institution. What would a world in which the ICC is absent look like, especially for U.S. national security interests?

There is no, and I doubt in our lifetime, there will be a replacement for the ICC. And by that, what I mean is, it is the only international court that currently exists that can quickly and immediately be activated to investigate and prosecute atrocity crimes in the broad span, territorial span, in the number of incidents that are currently there. has jurisdiction over. There's no replacement for that. So the question that you're asking really goes to what kind of a world would we have if we don't have or no longer have an institution that is readily available to investigate and prosecute international crimes that are committed, be it in the territory of a particular state, or as we've seen with Russia and Ukraine from one state against another. And the only consequence of that, and in fact, the consequence that led to the very reason why we have an international court, is that we no longer have an effective deterrence against the commission of those crimes and the widespread commission of those crimes in future situations. So we no longer have an institution that can step in to put pressure to mitigate the commission of atrocities in Sudan. We no longer have an institution that can step in to put pressure on the Taliban and their mistreatment and the systematic oppression of women in their country. We no longer have an institution that can investigate and prosecute Vladimir Putin for the crime of aggression and the other crimes committed as part of that war of aggression, including the war crimes and crimes against humanity for which there is now an open arrest warrant against him. And that's the world that we will more transition to. And that's not a world that I would argue any one of us want to see. It's not a world that I would argue that Congress at a bipartisan level has indicated that it wants to see. And nor is that a world that is obviously aligned with our national security interests, since that's only a world that will resolve in more, not less conflict.

And it's certainly a world that I certainly hope never materializes either. Nima, thank you so much for taking the time. This has been a really important conversation.

Thank you so much. And thank you for giving an opportunity for us to speak about this important matter. versions of this and other Lawfare podcasts by becoming a Lawfare material supporter through our website, lawfaremedia.org. You also get access to special events and other content available only to our supporters. Please rate and review us wherever you get your podcasts. Look out for other shows, including Rational Security, Chatter, Allies, and The Aftermath. Our latest Lawfare Presents podcast series on the government's response to January 6th. Check out our written work at lawfaremedia.org. The podcast is edited by Jen Patia, and your audio engineer this episode was Kara Schillen of Goat Rodeo. Our theme song is from Alibi Music. As always, thank you for listening.

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